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Tel het aantal keer "Heidegger zegt dat ..." en tel anderzijds het aantal kritische tegenargumenten tegen wat Heidegger zegt. Dan zal je op niet-oppervlakkige manier vaststellen dat de claims/ theorie onkritisch en met een appeal to authority gebracht worden. Leuk voor de fans van Heidegger (de video geeft je de illusie van confirmatie van de theorieen) maar rationeel van weinig waarde zonder tegenargument/ alternatieve theorie in confrontatie te brengen met zijn theorie. Denken en argumenteren moet altijd kritsch zijn als je iets wil bijleren, en niet "positief" of justificationistisch (in de zin van confirmatie te zoeken via appeal to authority van de source van de ideeën, zonder de inhoud van de ideeën te proberen weerleggen of verbeteren)

@@bartvanderhaegen6073 Wat had je anders verwacht van een college waarin een tekst van een filosoof in detail wordt besproken? Zo verloopt elk van dit soort colleges over grote denkers, en terecht. Denk ook aan het welwillendheidsbeginsel, o.a. besproken door Donald Davidson. (Lees bijv. de korte sectie "3.3 Radical Interpretation" op de Donald Davidson pagina van _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_ )

*3.3 Radical Interpretation* _Davidson’s strategy is to embed the formal structure for a theory of meaning (the structure he finds in a Tarskian truth theory) within a more general theory of interpretation the broad outlines of which he draws from Quine’s discussion in Word and Object (first published in 1960). ‘Radical translation’ is intended by Quine as an idealisation of the project of translation that will exhibit that project in its purest form. Normally the task of the translator is aided by prior linguistic knowledge - either of the actual language to be translated or of some related language. Quine envisages a case in which translation of a language must proceed without any prior linguistic knowledge and solely on the basis of the observed behaviour of the speakers of the language in conjunction with observation of the basic perceptual stimulations that give rise to that behaviour. Davidson has a broader conception of the behavioural evidence available than does Quine (he allows that we may, for instance, identify speakers as having the attitude of ‘holding true’ with respect to sentences) and, in addition, rejects the Quinean insistence on a special role being given to simple perceptual stimulations. Moreover, since Davidson’s interest is more properly semantic than Quine’s (Quine sees radical translation as part of a primarily epistemological inquiry), while Davidson also views a theory of translation alone as insufficient to ensure understanding of the language it translates (the translation may be into a language we do not understand), so the notion of ‘translation’ is replaced in the Davidsonian account with that of ‘interpretation’. Radical interpretation is a matter of interpreting the linguistic behaviour of a speaker ‘from scratch’ and so without reliance on any prior knowledge either of the speaker’s beliefs or the meanings of the speaker’s utterances. It is intended to lay bare the knowledge that is required if linguistic understanding is to be possible, but it involves no claims about the possible instantiation of that knowledge in the minds of interpreters (Davidson thus makes no commitments about the underlying psychological reality of the knowledge that a theory of interpretation makes explicit)._ _The basic problem that radical interpretation must address is that one cannot assign meanings to a speaker’s utterances without knowing what the speaker believes, while one cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s utterances mean. It seems that we must provide both a theory of belief and a theory of meaning at one and the same time. Davidson claims that the way to achieve this is through the application of the so-called ‘principle of charity’ (he refers to it briefly elsewhere as the principle of ‘rational accommodation’), a version of which is also to be found in Quine. In Davidson’s work this principle, which admits of various formulations and cannot be rendered in any completely precise form, often appears in terms of the injunction to optimise agreement between ourselves and those we interpret, that is, it counsels us to interpret speakers as holding true beliefs (true by our lights at least) wherever it is plausible to do (see ‘Radical Interpretation’ [1973]). In fact the principle can be seen as combining two notions: a holistic assumption of rationality in belief (‘coherence’) and an assumption of causal relatedness between beliefs, especially perceptual beliefs, and the objects of belief (‘correspondence’) (see ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’ [1991]). The process of interpretation turns out to depend on both aspects of the principle. Attributions of belief and assignments of meaning must be consistent with one another and with the speaker’s overall behaviour; they must also be consistent with the evidence afforded by our knowledge of the speaker’s environment, since it is the worldly causes of beliefs that must, in the ‘most basic cases’, be taken to be the objects of belief (see ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’ [1983]). Inasmuch as charity is taken to generate particular attributions of belief, so those attributions are, of course, always defeasible. The principle itself is not so, however, since it remains, on the Davidsonian account, a presupposition of any interpretation whatsoever. Charity is, in this respect, both a constraint and an enabling principle in all interpretation. It is more than just a heuristic device to be employed in the opening stages of interpretative engagement._ _If we assume that the speaker’s beliefs, at least in the simplest and most basic cases, are largely in agreement with our own, and so, by our account, are largely true, then we can use our own beliefs about the world as a guide to the speaker’s beliefs. And, provided that we can identify simple assertoric utterances on the part of a speaker (that is, provided we can identify the attitude of holding true), then the interconnection between belief and meaning enables us to use our beliefs as a guide to the meanings of the speaker’s utterances, thereby providing the basis for both a rudimentary theory of belief and a rudimentary account of meaning. So, for example, when the speaker with whom we are engaged uses a certain sequence of sounds repeatedly in the presence of what we believe to be a rabbit, we can, as a preliminary hypothesis, interpret those sounds as utterances about rabbits or about some particular rabbit. Once we have arrived at a preliminary assignment of meanings for a significant body of utterances, we can test our assignments against further linguistic behaviour on the part of the speaker, modifying those assignments in accordance with the results. Using our developing theory of meaning we are then able to test the initial attributions of belief that were generated through the application of charity, and, where necessary, modify those attributions also. This enables us, in turn, to further adjust our assignments of meaning, which enables further adjustment in the attribution of beliefs, … and so the process continues until some sort of equilibrium is reached. The development of a more finely tuned theory of belief thus allows us to better adjust our theory of meaning, while the adjustment of our theory of meaning in turn enables us to better tune our theory of belief. Through balancing attributions of belief against assignments of meaning, we are able to move towards an overall theory of behaviour for a speaker or speakers that combines both a theory of meaning and of belief within a single theory of interpretation._

Begrijp ik u goed? Zegt u dat zodra religie erin betrokken wordt - ook al bevatten religieuze teksten soms elementen die zijn terug te voeren op bijvoorbeeld ethiek uit de klassieke oudheid - men zich diskwalificeert als wijsgeer? En dat de bron belangrijker is dan de boodschap? Ik ga hier niet de christelijke ethiek verdedigen. Maar het kan de moeite waard zijn u er eens in te verdiepen. Niet om u al dan niet te overtuigen van het bestaan van God, maar om te zien hoezeer die met dezelfde hersenbrekers bezig houdt als waar niet-religieuze wijsgeren over peinzen. En ik hoop, dat u dan zult zien dat gelovige mensen niet per sé domme, goedgelovige of angstige mensen zijn, die troost zoeken in sprookjes. Ben ik gelovig? Nu ja, ik zou zeggen een eeuwig twijfelende, kritische en a-kerkelijke gelovige die bij vooral veel dogma's grote vraagtekens stelt en die niet bang is om ver voorbij de religieuze wereld te kijken. En al wat ik zie, zijn mensen die steeds meer worstelen met dezelfde problemen. Die van wanhoop, eenzaamheid, onbegrip, haat ook. Met of zonder het bestaan van een godheid, is dat iets dat ik zo graag zou willen overbruggen. Niet door voor de vuist weg met kwalificaties te smijten, maar door te luisteren wat iemand bezielt en te kijken of wij overeenkomsten hebben, die aanknopingspunten voor wederzijdse waardering bieden. En neen, ik geloof niet in sprookjes; ik hoop alleen dat religie een kern van waarheid/wijsheid bevat die ons allen helpt betere wegen voorwaarts te vinden. Redelijkheid, het uitstellen of zelfs afstellen van een oordeel is daarbij naar mijn mening behulpzaam. Anders hebben wij slechts nog een oerwoud aan meningen - gefundeerd en ongefundeerd - waarvan Amerikaanse collega militairen zeiden: "Opinions are like assholes, everybody has one and they all produce the same shit." 😉