Видео

🌏🌎🌍

❤❤❤❤❤❤

I love you babe

That voice tho

Gotta be to survive

❤💋💯

Love you too ❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️😘🎯♒🎶💦💯💋🔥🔥🔥🔥🤯💎💎💎🙏🙏🙏

❤💯💎🙏🪶🦅♒🎯⭐⭐⭐⭐

Only if you want to be 🔗♾️

❤❤❤Love you KG Keep Grinding Hard ❤❤❤

Awesome 👌 👏 👍 😍 ❤❤❤❤❤love ❤️ 😍 💖 ❣️ 💕 💘 ❤️ 😍

❤

My Guy! Holding it down 4 the NW😮

Real walls real gats foreigns get back I'm getting mine back I put in the bag cause of you they been shorting how I make it is grind harder cause I know you are trying to slide but ain't no bag behind me

This the one

❤❤❤I love y’all nice beat ❤❤❤

Gonna have to write ✍️

Great work bro!!This Beat is crazyyy. The arrangement of the drums are perfectly fitted whit the melody

Yuhh this fya

Real 💯 % genuine

❤❤❤

The mind is strong and the will power got to be stronger everything can be achieved when you think with God 💯

Love you KG ❤❤❤❤

Not a convict! Lol

It's locked down and at peace 🫶🏾✊🏾⚖️

Ready 4❤❤❤❤❤Real Life Trust Allah Soulmates are Beautiful Blessings

SelfMade 🌟🌟🌟🌟🌟💕💕💕💕🆙1️⃣🫶🏽🎶🎶🎶🔥🔥

❤❤❤❤

Re 🆙 ❤❤❤❤❤Love You KG ☕️

Awesome 👌 👏 👍 😍 💖 🆒️ 👌 👏 👍 😍 💖 🆒️ 😢❤❤❤❤

❤

A legend ain't never late

ana argued days prior to the decision, “NATO has to have the opportunity on a case by case basis to act, if necessary, under [its] own decision, always with an appropriate legal base, and always within the spirit of the [UN] charter. . . . There may be moments in which it is necessary to act for humanitarian reasons, when a UN Security Council resolution will not be necessary or will not be even appropriate because the UN charter does not contemplate humanitarian acts.” As for NATO’s right to act without explicit UN authorization, Solana argued that “it is a serious organization that takes a decision by consensus among serious countries with democratic governments,” implying this fact alone conferred sufficient legitimacy on the contemplated action

The Charter of Paris, in particular, could supply the foundation on which to build a solid legal basis for NATO action in non-Article 5 situations, including the threat or use of military force, at least in cases involving genocide and or other serious violations of human rights. To be sure, this document, like the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, affirms the principle of non-use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state. But by emphasizing the primacy of human rights and affirming that “full respect for these precepts is the bedrock on which we will seek to construct the new Europe,” the Charter provides a foundation for military action in response to gross violations of human rights or the denial of fundamental freedoms, at least within Europe. Of course, determining whether such an extreme violation has occurred will always remain subject to differing interpretations among the allies. Nevertheless, if and when a NATO of at least nineteen democratic states can agree that such a violation has occurred and forceful action is deemed necessary, then such action could be judged to be legitimate. In short, an agreed legal basis along these lines would enable the Alliance to take such action as it sees fit in cases of threats to or breaches of international peace and security involving gross violations of the human rights principles that are articulated in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, and further refined in the Charter of Paris

No country would accept constraints on its freedom to act on behalf of its own interests in the manner and at a time it judges best. It argues that the same should be true for any organization of democratic states that acts on the basis of consensus. It was not until the crisis in Kosovo erupted in 1998 that the NATO allies were confronted with the practical implications of what had been up to that point a largely theoretical argument. By early fall, the Alliance was forced to consider whether to threaten significant air strikes against Serbia, a sovereign country in the middle of Europe engaged in indiscriminate violence against civilians in the province of Kosovo. France and others argued that NATO, as a defensive alliance, could not act in situations other than self-defense unless the action was explicitly authorized by the United Nations. Rejecting a NATO capable of issuing its own mandate as a “Holy Alliance,” French President Jacques Chirac argued that Paris “insists . . . on the need for a Security Council mandate for every NATO military intervention.” This view was shared by most NATO governments in Europe, including Germany. Always hesitant about using military force, Bonn was particularly cautious in staking out a new position in the run-up to the October Kosovo decision given that elections in late September 1998 had brought to power a new, center-left government. The United States, in contrast, argued that UN authorization would be welcome but not necessary for NATO to act. As the Pentagon’s spokesman argued in early October, “The U.S. view has always been that NATO has the right to act on its own-the right and the obligation to act on its own in matters of European security.” Aside from these theoretical differences, the Alliance also faced a practical complication. Although the UN Security Council had unanimously voted in September 1998 to demand both a halt to the indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations in Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serb security forces engaged in attacks, a new resolution authorizing NATO to enforce compliance with these demands faced a near-certain Russian and/or Chinese veto. After an agonizing series of diplomatic discussions and last-minute reports of a possible diplomatic breakthrough, the North Atlantic Council voted on October 13, 1998, to activate NATO forces and authorize its supreme commander to commence air strikes following a ninety-six hour delay. Faced with the likelihood that the UN Security Council would veto NATO action while a looming humanitarian catastrophe threatened tens of thousands of refugees stuck in the Kosovo mountains during winter, NATO decided to act. Allied nations offered a variety of legal rationales for their decision-including the fact that the UN Security Council had on two separate occasions identified the crisis inside Serbia as posing a “threat to international peace and security.” The situation thus warranted enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Serbs had also clearly violated the Geneva Convention on warfare. What proved decisive for many allies, however, was not that NATO under these circumstances could mandate itself to act, but rather the belief that the humanitarian crisis inside Kosovo could not be prevented without forceful action. As NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana argued days prior to the decision, “NATO has to have the opportunity on a case by case basis to act, if necessary, under [its] own decision, always with an appropriate legal base, and always within the spirit of the [UN] charter. . . . There may be moments in which it is necessary to act for humanitarian reasons, when a UN Security Council resolution will not be necessary or will not be even appropriate because the UN charter does not contemplate humanitarian acts.” As for NATO’s right to act without explicit UN authorization, Solana argued that “it is a serious organization that takes a decision by consensus among serious countries with democratic governments,” implying this fact alone conferred sufficient legitimacy on the contemplated action. Despite having taken this decision, the NATO allies remain divided over whether Kosovo set a precedent for the future. Whereas the United States suggested that Kosovo demonstrated that NATO could act without an explicit UN Security Council mandate, other governments steadfastly maintained that this decision should not be seen as creating a right for NATO to arrogate a mandate. Where does this leave the Alliance? In principle, NATO may embark on non-Article 5 missions without the consent of the government(s) involved only if its actions enjoy the authorization of the UN Security Council. In practice, however, limiting NATO to those actions that have been approved by the Security Council could subject the Alliance to an effective veto by China or Russia. For this reason, NATO should not bind itself to a position that bars action in non-Article 5 contingencies if UN approval is not forthcoming. At the same time, although consensus among nineteen democratic states does provide a certain degree of legitimacy, the notion that NATO may arrogate the legal right to intervene in conflicts against the will of the government concerned is unsustainable. NATO cannot for long act like the Athenians who, in confronting the Melians during the Peloponnesian War, justified their action by asserting that “the strong do what they will, the weak do what they must.” While Melos was conquered, Thucydides has reminded us that Athenian hubris proved to be that power’s subsequent undoing. Of course, in view of the lack of consensus within NATO on when and how to intervene, the point may well be moot. Nevertheless, the use or threat of force ought to have a legal basis sound enough to be acceptable both to NATO publics and to the vast majority of the international community. The Kosovo model of constructive ambiguity goes a long way toward filling the gap between requiring an express UN mandate on the one hand and NATO’s self-mandating on the other. This approach recognizes that the authority to act in difficult cases may not be viewed in precisely the same way by every NATO member state, some of which may embrace a right of humanitarian intervention in response to gross violations of human rights or genocide, while others may require at least some relevant Security Council resolution short of express authorization (e.g., a finding that the conflict in question threatens international peace and security). Constructive ambiguity can thus allow agreed action to occur at a time when legal norms regarding the use of force in situations other than self-defense are still evolving.

It is therefore not surprising that the United States does not share France’s perspective on this issue. Indeed, Washington prefers NATO precisely for the reasons Paris does not-the Alliance not only provides the United States with an institutional entrée into Europe, but it is also an organization in which its influence is greater than that in any other international body. But there are more substantial reasons for U.S. opposition to the legalistic perspective France has championed. Critical among these is the implication of the French position that NATO’s use of force in many non-Article 5 contingencies would be subject to a veto by two states (Russia and China) that do not share many of the values and interests that have long united the members of the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, since both countries want to avoid setting the precedent that NATO or any other organization or groupings of states can intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states, and if such intervention were to be conditioned on UN approval, either or both of the states is bound to use its veto in the Security Council to prevent forceful NATO action. As a result, the insistence on a UN mandate implies that the type of behavior Europe has witnessed in the Balkans during the last decade, including the widespread abuse of human rights and denial of fundamental freedoms, would go effectively unpunished or undeterred. Given this practical reality, the United States favors leaving the decision on whether or not to use force up to the organization that would be responsible for undertaking such action-in this case to NATO. The Clinton Administration has argued that if nineteen democracies deem the threat or use of force necessary to right a specific wrong, then that fact in and of itself provides sufficient justification and legitimacy for the contemplated action. No country would accept constraints on its freedom to act on behalf of its own interests in the manner and at a time it judges best. It argues that the same should be true for any organization of democratic states that acts on the basis of consensus

NATO’s use of force; and a U.S. perspective that essentially argues that NATO has the right to use force whenever the interests of its members so require. The French perspective is based on the notion that the use force in international affairs, by a single state or group of states like NATO, is ultimately governed by the United Nations Charter. The UN Security Council is empowered by the Charter to determine the existence of any threat to or breach of peace (Article 39). At the same time, the Charter recognizes that states have the right to defend themselves individually and collectively (Article 51) and that regional arrangements or agencies can maintain peace and security within their region, provided they do so in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN (Article 52). The first purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security (Article 1) and one of its key principles requires members to refrain from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” (Article 2). Given this legal foundation, it follows that NATO can resort to force in self-defense, either of a member state that is attacked or of a non-member state so long as the government of that state requests NATO’s assistance. The former situation falls squarely within the collective defense commitment of the Washington treaty; the latter, as the case of Bosnia demonstrated, follows logically from the right of collective self-defense. At the same time, NATO cannot use force against another UN member state without its government’s consent if the action is not itself in defense of another UN member state unless the action is specifically authorized by the UN Security Council. That is the import of both Article 2 (which prohibits the use force against the territory or political independence of another state) and the proviso of Article 52 which limits action by regional arrangements such as NATO to those that are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. It follows from this reasoning that NATO can only use force in non-Article 5 contingencies either if it is invited to do so by the state involved or if it is explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council. Accordingly, France (with support from some allies) has insisted that the revised NATO strategic concept should explicitly predicate the use of force by NATO in these circumstances on the Alliance receiving a mandate from the UN Security Council

, NATO’s Article 5 commitment in principle would come into play, thus necessitating an Alliance response. In practice, however, the allies are unlikely to agree on the nature of either the challenge or the preferred response because their interests would be affected in different ways if any of these situations occurs. Whereas during the cold war forward defense in Germany was seen as the best way to defend not only Germany but also one’s own country against a Soviet invasion, a regional conflict or a single ballistic missile attack on one NATO country would have different implications for those allies not directly affected by the attack. The risks of direct military involvement would consequently differ, raising the likelihood that not all allies would respond similarly. That such differences can arise was demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf war when, faced with the possibility that Turkey might suffer Iraqi military retaliation, some senior German politicians argued, contrary to explicit NATO decisions, that Article 5 might not even apply. In other words, when the source and specific circumstances for an attack on a NATO member are uncertain or contested, the interests of individual allies-and their willingness to respond militarily-are likely to differ as well. Some situations in which allied territory is confronted with a direct armed attack may not be regarded by all allies as constituting the type of attack envisaged under Article 5. Two examples can help illustrate the point. First, if Iraq had responded to the four-day air campaign by the United States and Great Britain in December 1998 by launching a ballistic missile attack against Incirlik Air Force base in Turkey, some allies who objected to the British and U.S. action might have been unwilling to consider this an attack on a NATO member of the kind that would fall under Article 5. In a sense, the Iraqi retaliation was provoked by the U.S. and British air strikes and might, as such, be viewed as something less than a direct attack against a NATO country. Second, if a terrorist attack had occurred against a U.S. target on allied territory in response to the bombing of the Al Shifa chemical plant in Sudan (an action which few U.S. allies supported), it is doubtful that many, if any, allies would have viewed this as an Article 5 contingency. Indeed, neither the disco bombing in Berlin in 1986 nor the bombing of PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, both of which were terrorist attacks against U.S. targets on or over allied territory, was viewed in such a manner. Differences over the nature and reason of an armed attack against allied territory are thus likely to remain sources of contention in determining whether any NATO response is warranted and, if so, what the appropriate response might be. Another type of military challenge that may require a NATO military response involves crises or threats that do not directly affect allied territory, but that may have implications for important national or humanitarian interests. Bosnia and Kosovo represent two instances where the Alliance has made such a determination, deciding to use or threaten to use military force even though the Article 5 collective defense commitment was not directly at stake. In recent years, allied leaders and others have pointed to crisis management and other non-Article 5 contingencies that could require NATO’s military involvement-to address a humanitarian emergency, counter proliferation, respond to terrorism, avoid or mitigate genocidal violence, or deter or defeat major aggression in non-European regions. There is no doubt that NATO could embark on these types of missions if its members so desired. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has explained, “founders of the Alliance were wise to allow us the flexibility to come together to meet common threats that could originate from beyond our immediate borders. . . . [W]hile the North Atlantic Treaty involves commitments to collective defense, it also allows us to come together to meet common threats that might originate from beyond the North Atlantic area.”

PRÉCIS The debate surrounding NATO’s evolution from a collective defense alliance to an organization primarily concerned with managing crises centers around three questions: 1. Under what circumstances should NATO threaten use of force? The traditional criterion-self-defense against armed attack on any member’s home territory (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty)-is too narrow. There is no doubt that NATO could embark on missions using force, if its members so desired, to confront crises or threats that do not directly affect allied territory but that may have implications for important national or humanitarian interests, (e.g., confronting arms proliferation or genocide)-though to what extent remains disputed within the alliance. The possibility for joint military action in a non-Article 5 context should not be conditioned on unanimous consent. An alliance that provides rapid and effective responses to crises in and outside allied territory, even if action is taken by a subset of allies, is preferable to one that conditions action on potentially unattainable unanimous support. 2. How far should NATO’s writ extend geographically? The American vision of a NATO acting globally is not widely shared by the European allies. For most of the Europeans, NATO’s fundamental purpose is to provide security in and for Europe. They have come to accept that NATO’s role extends into the Balkans-but this is about as far as it should go; for them, NATO remains a regional organization whose role is confined to the Euro-Atlantic region. 3. What is the legal basis for the threat or use of force by NATO in any of these situations? Two competing perspectives have emerged-a French perspective that gives the U.N. Security Council the primary role in authorizing NATO’s use of force; and a U.S. perspective that NATO has the right to use force whenever the interests of its members so require. The NATO allies remain divided on whether Kosovo set a precedent for the future. Limiting NATO to actions that have been approved by the Security Council could subject the alliance to an effective veto by China or Russia. For this reason, NATO should not bind itself to a position that bars action in non-Article 5 contingencies if U.N. approval is not forthcoming. Still, the threat or use of force ought to have a legal basis sound enough to be acceptable both to the NATO public and to the vast majority of the international community-e.g., based on the U.N. Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, or the 1990 Charter of Paris. Throughout much of its fifty year existence, the question of when and how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could or would use force was not in dispute. As a military alliance formed to provide for the collective defense of its members, NATO sought to deter and, if necessary, defend against an attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies against the territory of one or more of its members. In case of such an attack, NATO’s military response against Warsaw Pact territory would have been both swift and automatic. The justification for this response would have come from the collective defense commitment enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is itself based on the right of individual and collective self-defense guaranteed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter

But what’s indisputable is NAFTA’s impact on the global drug trade and on the massive wealth and power accumulated by Mexican cartels and kingpins, like Sinaloa cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.

NATO - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - is an alliance of 30 European and North American countries, including the United States. Its foundational document is the North Atlantic Treaty, which sets forth NATO’s purpose and obligations: ensuring peace and security through collective defense. NATO was formed shortly after the end of World War II, at the dawn of the Cold War. The organization’s collective defense obligations, detailed in Article 5, have been invoked only once, on behalf of the United States after 9/11. Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine has sparked concerns that Russian President Vladimir Putin may expand the scope of the conflict to NATO members like Poland and Lithuania, triggering NATO’s collective defense obligations. Many in the public are now asking what NATO’s collective defense obligations mean for the United States. What are a NATO member’s collective defense obligations? Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking . . . such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. This language is relatively flexible. It permits each NATO member to decide for itself what action should be taken to address an armed attack on a NATO ally. It does not require any member to respond with military force, although it permits such responses as a matter of international law. A member may decide that instead of responding with force, it will send military equipment to NATO allies or impose sanctions on the aggressor. If a NATO ally is attacked, would Article 5 authorize the president to send U.S. forces into conflict? No. Even if a NATO ally is attacked and Article 5 is invoked, the president needs to obtain congressional authorization before sending the military into a conflict zone or otherwise using force. Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty explains that “its provisions [shall be] carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” In the United States, that means securing express authorization from Congress, which has the sole constitutional power to declare war and is responsible for military appropriations and oversight. Consider that treaties are made by the president, with the consent of the Senate. If the invocation of a collective defense treaty automatically allowed the president to use force abroad, the House would be wholly excluded from decisions about where, when, and how the country goes to war. The Senate would play a role secondary to the president. Such a scheme would violate the Constitution’s text and design, which vest “[t]he whole powers of war” in Congress, according to a foundational Supreme Court opinion. Congress endorsed this analysis in the 1973 War Powers Resolution, a Vietnam War-era law that reaffirms the president’s obligation to seek congressional authorization before using offensive force. The War Powers Resolution states that congressional authorization to use force “shall not be inferred . . . from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified.” What about the president’s inherent powers as commander in chief? The president’s inherent powers as commander in chief would not allow the president to send the military into a conflict zone or otherwise use military force in response to an invocation of Article 5. The Constitution vests the president with the power to defend U.S. territory and citizens, even without express authorization. But it does not permit the president to use force against an adversary who poses no direct threat to the United States, as would be involved in a military campaign to assist a NATO ally. Since the Cold War, executive branch lawyers have tried to broaden the scope of the president’s inherent powers. They have argued that the Constitution permits the president to defend not only U.S. territory and citizens but also more abstract national interests, such as the credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations. As many experts have noted, this open-ended “national interest” theory is constitutionally dubious. Still, executive branch lawyers concede that the president cannot unilaterally commit the military to a conflict of substantial nature, scope, and duration, even if there is a strong national interest. Any military confrontation between Russia and NATO would surely be of a substantial nature, scope, and duration - and would therefore require congressional authorization. This limitation on the president’s inherent powers explains why President George W. Bush sought congressional authorization for the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War, large-scale conflicts involving ground forces.

What could Congress’s response to an invocation of Article 5 look like? If Congress were to decide that a military response is “necessary,” Congress could declare war or, more likely, adopt a limited authorization to use force. For years, experts and advocates have agreed that any authorization to use force should specify the conflict’s purpose and geographical scope, as well as the identity of the enemy, and that it should include an expiration date. These limitations ensure that Congress reviews the authorization on a regular basis and understands where, why, and against whom U.S. forces are fighting. Would waiting for Congress conflict with our obligations to aid our NATO allies? No. Our NATO allies understand that legislatures play an important role in determining what kind of support is “necessary” to respond to an invocation of Article 5. After 9/11, NATO’s governing body invoked Article 5 and called upon the NATO allies to support the United States in its response to the terrorist attacks. In turn, the leaders of NATO allies like Germany asked their legislatures for permission to deploy forces. On November 16, 2001, the German Bundestag voted to commit 3,900 troops to fight in Afghanistan as a means of fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. Moreover, Congress can act quickly in response to national security developments, and it would likely do so for any invocation of Article 5. Congress passed the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, the congressional authorization to pursue those responsible for 9/11, on September 14, 2001. In 1964, it passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution just three days after the supposed incident that prompted President Lyndon Johnson’s request for authorization to use force in Vietnam.

The North American Free Trade Agreement took effect 25 years ago this week, boosting trade across the United States, Canada, and Mexico. But it also helped fuel the modern drug trade. NAFTA phased out tariffs across North America, making it easier for freight trucks to cross the border. Between 1994 and 2001, the number of trucks crossing into the U.S. from Mexico nearly doubled to roughly 4.3 million per year. U.S. border officials only inspected about 10 percent of these trucks, leaving a big opening for drug traffickers. A decade after NAFTA, 90 percent of Colombian cocaine was smuggled through the southwest border. Mexico, which had always been the Walmart of marijuana and heroin, quickly became, as the Wall Street Journal put it, the FedEx of the cocaine business. Economists disagree about NAFTA’s ultimate impact on the North American economy. And the future of the trade pact will be up for debate in 2019 when Congress decides whether to ratify its replacement, the United States Mexico Canada Agreement, or USMCA.But what’s indisputable is NAFTA’s impact on the global drug trade and on the massive wealth and power accumulated by Mexican cartels and kingpins, like Sinaloa cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.

GSA Logo Order of Succession - Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) 1. Purpose This Order establishes the order of succession for the General Services Administration, OSDBU. 2. Cancellation This Order cancels GSA Order SDBU 1080.1. 3. Nature of Revision This Order specifies those officials designated to act during the absence or incapacity of the Associate Administrator. 4. Designations In order to ensure at all times an official with appropriate authority, the following officials are designated to serve as Acting Associate Administrator of OSDBU, in the following order if the Associate Administrator of OSDBU becomes incapacitated, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the position. This will also apply to the order of succession for devolution. Each designee shall act with the full authority and responsibility of the Associate Administrator of OSDBU. In the event that the official designated is not available, the next designated official will act. This Order of Succession replaces any previous OSDBU Order of Succession. Chief of Staff (E) Director, Small Business Advocacy & Engagement East Division (EC) Supervisory Small Business Specialist (ES4) Program Analyst (E) Management and Program Analyst (E) This Order of Succession applies to the permanent incumbent of each position rather than to anyone who may be temporarily occupying a position. In the event that an official is serving in an acting capacity, the designation will pass to the next-designated permanent incumbent. Further, each official shall act only if the immediately preceding official has died, becomes incapacitated, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the OSDBU Associate Administrator. 5. Exercise of Authority An official serving as Acting Associate Administrator shall, in that capacity, exercise all the authorities and perform all the functions and duties of the office of the Associate Administrator.

Only real ones can no one else nothing is Stronger then the quiet one

The only way you can touch my pain is through my pen spoken works a token to slash me one more time .

Wish i could turn it back The hands of time No never mind I feel tho not in feelings You are healing me I can love again I can love again . Written by: Mr Justin Berthelot Sr. Aka Ghost

#5 like 👑

I'm her. And Kevin Gates is HIM AND NOW HE IS FREE. MOSES? OR MESSIAH'S MESSAGE

Are you sure you're ready to 😍 again don't just jump back into the fire search for your equal spirit if you found peace in one then you ready to 😍 again whole. 🙏🏾🔗💪🏾🫶🏾🤘🏽✊🏾 the one